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Throughout history, people have suffered for the sake of their religion. Religious organisations 
have been forbidden or governments have tightly controlled them. The constitutional protection 
of freedom of religion is a necessity. In a religiously pluralistic world, granting the guarantee is 
also in the state’s best interest. Yet religions have been hesitant to embrace the guarantee. It im-
plies secularism. Religious freedom is balanced against other freedoms, and against legitimate 
state interests. Government is faced with social forces that are grounded in eternity and that can-
not be proven to be wrong. Seemingly the constitutional protection is a threatening for religions 
and the state as it is beneficial. Yet the essentially pragmatic nature of law overcomes the tragic 
dilemma – albeit only at the price of acknowledging that jurisprudence is policy-making. 
Keywords: religions freedom, neutrality principle, human rights, pragmatism, proportionality 
principle, balancing, margin of appreciation, regulability 
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I. The  Issue 
Religion is universal. Everywhere in the world, people believe that there exist forces they cannot 
see with their eyes, and that even science cannot make visible for them. They believe that these 
forces matter for their lives, be it today or after their physical existence will have come to an end. 
Usually they even believe that these unintelligible forces command goods or evils that have 
higher value than anything money can buy, political power can impose, or attachment can be-
stow. Yet this universal human trait has played itself out very differently across time and space. 
Some religions believe there is one God. Others believe there are many gods. Yet others do not 
personify the supreme forces at all. For some religions, life after death is the supreme goal. In 
others, not being forced into reincarnation is bliss. Some religions care about saving the souls of 
those who have not had the privilege of meeting God. Others do not feel the urge to spread their 
mission. The list of differences is at least as long as the number of religions. And there are scep-
tics. While of course nobody is able to prove that religion is superstition, the existence of reli-
gion, or the correctness of the beliefs on which a specific religion is grounded, cannot be proven 
either. By its very nature, religion defies human epistemic abilities. Sceptics go on: and therefore 
I ignore it; or even: and therefore it should be ignored. 
Since from the perspective of a religious person being in line with the commands of one's reli-
gion is of the utmost importance, throughout history religious leaders have sided with worldly 
powers. In the name of religion, wars have been declared, countries have been depopulated, 
those holding a different belief have been prosecuted, freedom of expression has been stifled. It 
has taken religious leaders centuries to adopt a more tolerant attitude. Instead of combating com-
peting religions, and of forcing pagans to join them, some now aim at organising peaceful coex-
istence. While historically, the main driving force behind this shift in attitude has been the expe-
rience of all too many cruelties, globalisation has added a new facet. The world's economy re-
munerates physical by social mobility. Those who move to the thriving centres stand a much 
better chance to secure a prosperous life for themselves and their families. Yet the ensuing mi-
gration engenders religious pluralism in many societies that used to be religiously homogeneous. 
Peaceful coexistence implies freedom of religion (Huster 2002; Grimm 2009:2371). While one 
religion may well deeply believe all or some other religions to be fatally wrong, it still accepts 
that other religions think differently. It may try to persuade the adherents of different religions to 
convert. But it will not force them to give in to what this one religion, from an internal perspec-
tive, of course believes to be the truth. This attitude of tolerance could follow from insight. It 
might even be backed up by religious doctrine. Yet insight is elusive, and different religions are 
very differently prepared to build tolerance into their set of doctrines. It was a horrendous reli-
gious war that prompted Thomas Hobbes to proclaim absolute state power (Hobbes 1651). The 
state is able to guarantee religious freedom precisely because it musters the power to coerce. It 
may not only oblige but even effectively force reluctant religious leaders and fanatic followers to 
play by the rules of peaceful coexistence. This is not only important with respect to what the lit-
erature tends to call "strong religions" (see e.g. Sajó 2009:2403 and 2421). If the state credibly 
commits to combating aggression between religions, it also creates a level playing field. Reli-3 
 
gions that would not intrinsically be aggressive have no longer reason to nonetheless act aggres-
sively, just because they are afraid otherwise their theological competitors will invade their 
spheres. 
For Thomas Hobbes, containing the war of all against all was so important that he postulated the 
moral obligation to absolutely transfer original individual liberty to a worldly ruler. Unsurpris-
ingly, the ensuing historical experiments amply extolled the downside of the solution. Heads of 
state abused their powers lavishly. Quite a few of them were not enlightened, but stupid or reck-
less. Even religious wars did not disappear. Religious divergence served as a pretext for coun-
tries invading each other, in the interest of enlarging their territories. It once more took centuries 
before sovereignty was constitutionalised. Constitutional states rest on the idea of sovereignty. 
Yet the exercise of sovereign powers is bounded by a rich institutional arrangement, the law. The 
law sets substantive and procedural limits. Those in power may not overstep these limits. When 
they exercise sovereign powers, they have to obey the constitutional rules for making and for 
applying rules. 
The constitutional state is not only in a position to enforce religious tolerance without the risk of 
itself deteriorating into tyranny. Once all governance is constitutionally embedded, the state also 
disposes of much more elegant technologies for managing a religiously pluralistic society. These 
subtle tools make the state sensitive to historic context. Interventions may keep the balance be-
tween determination and predictability on the one hand, and the maximum respect for the indi-
vidual religion to which they are targeted on the other hand. The state may use the same technol-
ogies for solving an equally pressing, related problem: the peaceful coexistence between state 
and religion(s). 
In the title of this paper, the term religious freedom is used to describe social reality. It character-
ises a society in which everyone is in principle free to hold the religious beliefs of their choosing, 
and to live their worldly lives in line with the commands of their religions. To make this possi-
ble, despite a plurality of religions, and in deference to the legitimate needs of the state, the state 
uses its sovereign powers to manage this plurality. Once the relationship between competing re-
ligions, and the relationship between religion and the state, are governed by law, religious free-
dom has a second meaning. This second meaning is doctrinal. The Constitution obliges govern-
ment to act in a way that makes peaceful coexistence practical. To that end the Constitution 
guarantees freedom of religion as a fundamental right. Consequently, a more complete version of 
the title of this paper would read: "The Constitutional Protection of Freedom of Religion as a 
Precondition for Making Religious Freedom Practical".  
In the following, I speak of religious freedom when I mean social reality, and of freedom of reli-
gion when I mean the constitutional guarantee. I then read the constitutional guarantee broadly. I 
mean it to encompass  any constitutional protection of religiously motivated action, and against 
any religiously motivated exercise of sovereign powers, even if concrete legal orders rather bring 
the respective action under the rubric of freedom of life and limb, of property, of immigration 4 
 
and emigration, of profession, or whichever constitutionally protected aspect of life may be af-
fected. 
My way of presenting the issue implicitly votes again two alternatives. The constitution of a 
country may more or less intensely side with one specific religion. This is of course the histori-
cally widespread model of a state religion. In its extreme form, as in the peace of Augsburg, it is 
built on the principle cuius regio, eius religio. Under that principle, freedom of religion is only 
granted to heads of state. If the Prince has chosen to be Protestant, his Catholic subjects must 
choose between leaving the country and converting. Today, some Islamic countries come close 
to this radical version of a state religion. Milder versions survive in Western democracies. A 
well-known example is England where one has to be Anglican to be Prime Minister. By contrast, 
this paper starts from the assumption that the Constitution does not privilege any religion. Doc-
trinally, this is the state of affairs in most democracies, and under human rights treaties. And 
practically, constitutional neutrality is a precondition for managing a religiously diverse society. 
This paper also votes against a more recent competing concept. This concept accuses the "en-
lightenment project" of being hidden ideology (Ladeur 2009; Rosenfeld 2009) (but see Raday 
2009). This claim is based on post-modern philosophy. It maintains that the distinction between 
faith and reason itself requires a leap of faith. In the name of "the religion of secularism", consti-
tutional law unnecessarily tramps on the exercise of religious freedom. I have two counterargu-
ments, one conceptual and one pragmatic. While I am willing to grant that our understanding of 
reality is bound to be constructed (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Thompson, Ellis et al. 1990), this 
does not mute objectivity as a regulative idea. Even if we know that we will never completely 
achieve it, it makes a difference whether we strive for intersubjectivity or not. My more im-
portant reason is, however, pragmatic. We need the neutral, disinterested, and at least purported-
ly objective vantage point of constitutionalised law to make a religiously plural society viable. 
Religion is as old as humanity. There has never been just one religion. Individual religions have 
sided with worldly forces to combat competing religions. And worldly authorities have fought 
religions as competing sources of power. Centuries ago, treaties and constitutions have guaran-
teed freedom of religion. I can therefore certainly not claim my research question to be new. I am 
also self-consciously confessing that I am very likely to have missed some earlier voices. I try to 
make two contributions. I first aim at finding a concise conceptual language for explaining why 
freedom of religion poses a dilemma: safeguarding this freedom is a necessity: for religions, and 
for the state (II). Yet at the same time, freedom of religion also is a threat: again for religions, 
and for the state (III). While theory helps understand the character of the dilemma, I try to show 
that theory cannot offer a closed solution. Against this backdrop, my second contribution is to 
show why only legal pragmatism is able to mitigate the dilemma, and how law becomes a pre-
condition for religious freedom (IV). 5 
 
II.  Freedom of Religion as a Necessity 
1. Necessity  for  Religions 
Freedom of religion, in its doctrinal meaning, i.e. the constitutional protection of holding and 
exercising one's freely chosen religion, first and foremost protects the individual believer. They 
invoke the constitutional guarantee when the state prevents them from some course of action 
which they claim is religiously mandated (more from Robbers 2005; Classen 2006; Grimm 2009; 
von Campenhausen 2009). Such prohibition may result from the state's desire to contain reli-
gious conflict. An example would be the interdiction for a procession to pass through a residen-
tial area mainly populated by militant members of a competing church. Or the prohibition may 
be grounded in a regulatory purpose that, at least at face value, has nothing to do with religion. 
An example would be the obligation for Sikhs to wear a helmet when riding a motorcycle.  
The believer may also invoke freedom of religion since she feels discriminated against due to her 
religion (more from Robbers 2005; Classen 2006; Grimm 2009; von Campenhausen 2009). 
Again, discrimination may result from the state directly privileging one religion. In modern con-
stitutional states, the privilege is frequently couched in the statement that the privilege is not 
granted to a religion, but to national “culture” (Roellecke 2007). Yet discrimination may also 
result from the application of rules that do not directly target religion. For instance, Native 
Americans complain that they are prosecuted for the sacramental use of peyote, while the ritual 
use of wine was allowed for Catholics and Jews during Prohibition (Rosenfeld 2009:2353). 
All of this certainly matters. Yet these are rather minor conflicts. Bringing them under the pur-
view of the Constitution is certainly conducive to making religious freedom practical. But one 
could hardly claim that such protection is a necessity. Happily enough, these days in civilised 
democracies, those conflicts that originally made the constitutional protection paramount are not 
real. But one need not go far back in history to find vital conflicts. Sadly enough, they can even 
be found in these days if only one broadens geographical scope. Most often, conflicts become 
vital once the state uses its sovereign powers to combat religion, be that in the interest of a state 
religion, or in the interest of atheism, as in the former communist countries. Consequently, con-
flicts have been particularly acute when the majority religion has sided with the state in its fight 
against religious minorities. 
Let me recall a few of the ominous examples from my own country. During the Nazi regime, the 
jews were almost extinguished, purportedly because of their race, but also because of their reli-
gion. Lamberti Church in Münster to these days still boasts three iron cages where the corpses of 
the leaders of the Anabaptist movement had been displayed after public execution. The Arch-
bishop of Salzburg forced thousands of his subjects who had clandestinely remained Protestants 
to leave the country within a couple of days. Many of them were permanently separated from 
their children. In the GDR, those who confessed their membership in a church stood little chance 
to receive university education, and many of them went to jail.  6 
 
Why were so many prepared to endure so much for the sake of their religions? Why does reli-
gion make so vulnerable? Certainly, the general utilitarian argument may be featured in: people 
seem to have a preference for a religious lifestyle. Everything else held constant, people holding 
this preference are better off if neither the state nor a competing religion prevent them from liv-
ing in line with the commands of their respective religions (Leiter 2008:7). Moreover, religions 
offer side benefits, like social solidarity, psychological comfort, and a better way of coping with 
the unknown and death (Raday 2009:2776). Yet none of this would suffice to explain martyr-
dom, or the willingness to sacrifice all professional aspirations. 
Such observations point to the fact that religious freedom is not an ordinary good. There are 
three reasons for this. For a believer, leading a religious life has extreme value. Believers know 
that they do not know. They must take faith for knowledge. Once they have made the leap of 
faith, they become tied to their choice. Finally, many religions threaten heretics with worldly 
sanctions. 
The first of the three reasons carries most weight. To understand how religious freedom is spe-
cial, it is helpful to use the utilitarian language of economics. Economic theory starts from pref-
erences. In the standard model, all is relative. The model assumes desires to be infinite. If I can 
have another piece of cake, another house, another education for free, I want it. The problem to 
be understood is how I choose if I cannot have everything, for instance since my wealth is lim-
ited. My preferences tell me how many units of one good I am willing to trade for a unit of an-
other. Apparently, for many believers the freedom to live a religious life does not fit this model. 
They are not willing to make tradeoffs. They do what their religion asks them to do, whatever the 
cost. 
There are several ways of capturing this behaviour within the economic model. One stays closest 
to the standard framework if one assumes standard preferences, but for the fact that the utility 
derived from a religious life is infinite. One may also model being in line with one's religion on 
the one hand and worldly goods on the other as strict complements. For religious individuals, 
worldly goods only have value conjointly with leading a religious life. Another modelling alter-
native is lexicographic preferences. Actors holding such preferences in principle engage in the 
same tradeoffs between ordinary goods as do standard agents. Yet they consider these trade-offs 
only if they first meet the minimum standard of a religious life their religion has set for them. 
One may also use non-economic language. Religions issue categorical demands on action, de-
mands that must be satisfied, no matter what the believer desires otherwise, and no matter what 
incentives or disincentives the world offers (Leiter 2008:15). Due to this, religious conflicts be-
come "intractable" (Rosenfeld 2009:2354). Religion not only provides the individual with well-
being, it provides her with an identity (Witte 2000). Identity is a precondition for the ability to 
choose (Ladeur 2009:2463). 
Why are religious values so important? Because they are transcendental. For a religious person, 
eternity is at stake. One may also say: for a religious person, obeying the commands of her reli-7 
 
gion is a precondition for dignity (Mahlmann 2009:2474). To this, religious doctrine frequently 
adds transcendental incentives. Those who live a religious life will be rewarded in Paradise. 
Those who commit sins at least have to endure the purgatory, if they do not directly go to hell. 
Not so rarely, religious doctrine even holds those living today responsible for the transcendental 
fate of their ancestors. If only they pray enough, the ancestors can be saved, the Mormons teach. 
Yet other religions even expect their members to simply save the world (Sajó 2009:2421). 
Credo quia absurdum, as Tertullian is said to have taught. A religious person may recognise God 
in any sunbeam. But those adhering to a different religion, or not religious at all, will not accept 
this as proof. From the very fact that religion is transcendental it follows that the superiority of 
one religion over another cannot be proven by scientific means. For the same reason, no religious 
person can prove that a command of her religion is vital. Religion requires faith (more from 
Macklem 2000). This increases vulnerability for two reasons. The first reason is a corollary of 
the fact that eternity is at stake. Therefore potentially mistakes are fatal (cf. Leiter 2008:15). The 
believer has to navigate uncertainty where certainty would be of the utmost importance. All the 
more she will stick to her conviction once she has made the leap of faith. Moreover since proof is 
out of the question, government stands no chance to convince the believer that the risk of com-
promising on a command of her religion is minor. 
Religions do not only threaten with transcendental sanctions. They also inflict tangible punish-
ment. They do not longer accept a believer to religious services, they prevent her from holding 
religious offices, or they even expel her. Religions also exploit private and public law for the 
purpose. They for instance fire an employee if she has aborted her child. Some religions even 
sanction believers for the mere fact that they have been soft on the violation of religious com-
mands by others (cf. Arce and Sandler 2003). 
Not all religions are organised in churches. But all religions are supra-individual. Religions are 
social, not individual phenomena. This is not only an empirical fact. It also follows from the im-
possibility of proving religious convictions to be true. Believers therefore feel the urge of reliev-
ing the burden of uncertainty by entrusting the formulation of religious commands, and the inter-
pretation of the signs that gods are sending them, to those holding an office, having better educa-
tion, or otherwise having superior access to the transcendental (cf. Grimm 2009:2373 and 2376). 
Organisations are much better regulatory targets than individuals. Government frequently ex-
ploits this fact. It for instance obliges a dozen of car producers to fit catalytic converters, rather 
than obliging millions of car owners to adopt a more environmentally friendly driving style. By 
the same token, a few tightly organised churches are much easier to monitor than millions of in-
dividual church members. Organisations are also more vulnerable. Ultimately, government can 
only break the individual's will by killing her. Even in jail she can go on proselyting. History 
provides ample proof of individuals who have indeed been willing to risk their lives for the sake 
of eternity. By contrast, for an organisation to function smoothly, people must meet, and re-
sources must be available. It is relatively easy for government to prevent people from meeting, 
and resources from being used.  8 
 
2.  Necessity for the State 
"Religion is opium for the people" (Marx 1844:71). Karl Marx had not meant this as a piece of 
advice to government. Yet the explanation he gave is utilitarian. "Religion is the sigh of the op-
pressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and the soul of the soulless conditions" (Marx 
1844:71). If there is the promise of a better life after death, people are willing to endure and to 
risk more. This may help government if it is unable to alleviate the burden, or if it even wants to 
knowingly impose hardship, for instance if it declares war. 
Among German lawyers, a more civilised, and a deeper version of the dictum is famous. "The 
liberal, secular state is built on conditions it cannot guarantee itself" (Böckenförde 1991:112). 
Constitutional lawyers have built a whole doctrine of "the preconditions of the Constitution" 
(Verfassungsvoraussetzungen) on this one sentence (see only Veröffentlichungen der Ver-
einigung der Staatsrechtslehrer 2009). Religion generates the culture of mutual respect that is a 
precondition for democratic government. Critically, the constitutional state lacks the mandate to 
create this culture itself. The state may intervene if words or actions can be shown to be danger-
ous. But the state is not entitled to educate the electorate (Lüdemann 2004). 
Freedom of religion also complements governmental assistance to the needy. Religious organisa-
tions are not only cheaper, and willing to help when public officials refuse to become active. 
More importantly, religious assistance is not just a service. For the recipients it matters that help 
has a soul (Seligman 2009:2881). Freedom of religion further complements freedom of expres-
sion. Religiously motivated speech enriches the marketplace of ideas (Mill 1859). Religious 
people are less easily tempted by worldly perks and therefore less vulnerable to corruption. Their 
faith even empowers them to resist fatal threat (Leiter 2008:16). This explains why deeply reli-
gious people were among the few who resisted totalitarian government, be that the Nazi state 
(the Bekennende Kirche) or the communist state in the GDR.  
Eventually the reverse side of this medal is even more compelling. Since for believers eternity is 
at stake, religious organisations may credibly threaten government with vigorous resistance 
against interventions that curtail what the religion considers to be essential. Sadly the US have 
seen devoutly religious persons bombing abortion clinics and flying airplanes into highrisers 
(Leiter 2008:16). In the technical language of economics: religions command high nuisance val-
ue. It is in the best interest of the state to accommodate, and to establish a regime of peaceful 
coexistence: among each religion and the state, and between religions. 
III.  Freedom of Religion as a Threat 
1. Threat  for  Religions 
The attitude of most religions towards freedom of religion as a constitutional guarantee is am-
bivalent at best. Over centuries, even the Christian churches have seen religious freedom as a 9 
 
threat, rather than a benefit (von Campenhausen 2009). In the Catholic church, this has only 
changed with the second Vatican Council (Dignitatis Humanae, 1966). In the Protestant church-
es, change was more gradual but also basically not before the middle of the 20th century (more 
from von Campenhausen 2009:517). In Israel, the religious lobby has seen to it that freedom of 
religion is not constitutionally recognised to these days (Raday 2009:2771). 
This hesitance has a reason. If the constitution guarantees freedom of religion, this implies secu-
larism. State action may not be grounded in the commands of any one religion (Krüger 1964:178 
ff.). Through the very guarantee, government is obliged to stay neutral between religions. The 
law starts from the assumption that there are different interpretations of the transcendental. For 
the purposes of law, no religion is unique or absolute. The law does not even assume that the set 
of religions is finite. If a new movement originates and claims to be a religion, this claim is to be 
assessed against an abstract definition of religiosity. Once freedom of religion is constitutionally 
protected, believers are not only legally obliged to accept a plurality of eternities as a matter of 
fact. Government is also prevented from openly siding with one religion. This has for instance 
led to the prohibition of prayer in US schools (Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)) and to the 
prohibition of hanging the crucifix in German classrooms (Crucifix, BVerfGE 95,1 (1995)). 
The doctrine of constitutional guarantees is not the same in all legal orders. In the German and in 
the European traditions, no fundamental right is absolute. Even if the provision does not explicit-
ly have limitations, these limitations result from the fact that the Constitution protects a whole 
set of freedoms, and that fundamental freedoms have to be harmonised with competing value 
judgements of the Constitution (this concept of "practical concordance" goes back to Hesse 
1995). Therefore other normative goals may be pitted against freedom of religion. The legislator 
may be prevented from turning religious belief into legal command, even if a large majority 
deems this desirable. A current case in point is the legalisation of homosexuality (Brown 2010; 
Gilreath 2010; Klein 2010). 
2.  Threat for the State 
Protecting freedom of religion is not without risk for the state either. In so doing, the constitu-
tional state faces the paradox of tolerance (Mahlmann 2009:2475). It grants a protected sphere to 
individuals and organisations that may not be inclined to reward the protection by being tolerant 
themselves with competing religions or with the state. Potentially religious freedom threatens the 
authority of the law (Mestmäcker 2010). The problem is particularly acute with what has been 
called "strong religions" (Rosenfeld 2009:2347; Sajó 2009:2403) like fundamentalist movements 
and sects (Richardson 2004). Devoutly religious individuals have not only resisted the Nazi re-
gime, they have also brought terrorism to Western democracies (Leiter 2008:16). The European 
Court of Human Rights has acknowledged the problem and allowed Turkey to dissolve a politi-
cal party since it aimed at abolishing the constitutional protection of secularism (Refah Partisi v. 
Turkey, 37 Eur.H.R.Rep 1, 33 (2003)) and it has allowed the German government to issue warn-
ings against the brainwashing methods applied by the Osho sect (Leela Förderkreis v. Germany, 10 
 
app. 58911/00 (2008)). By contrast, if a religion itself acknowledges a plurality of transcendental 
powers, like the religions prevalent in ancient Rome, the conflict is particularly mild. 
Freedom of religion is a threat for the state for the very same reasons that make this freedom 
valuable, and even necessary, for religion and the state itself. Religious goods are transcendental. 
The correctness of religious beliefs and commands defies proof. Many religions expect believers 
to bring faith to pagans and to save the souls of those who are not feeling the urge themselves. 
Again the transcendental character of religions carries most weight. For the individual believer, 
eternity is at stake. Living in line with the commands of her religion has infinite value. Worldly 
goods are only considered once the threshold of a life without sin has been passed. Worldly 
goods are worth nothing if religious commands are violated. From the internal perspective of 
religious belief systems, the individual believer is not entitled to compromise, whatever non-
religious reasons the state brings forward for limiting the exercise of religious freedom. The state 
lacks jurisdiction for the modification of religious doctrine. Religions systematically blur a line 
that is essential for the constitutional state. Religions are not content with legality. They ask for 
morality. From the perspective of her faith, if she gives in to governmental pressure, a religious 
person ventures transcendental sanctions. Her religious identity is in peril. Not so rarely, reli-
gious organisations may also inflict earthly harm. 
The state is not only likely to provoke religious resistance if it prevents believers and religious 
organisations from specific courses of action. By the very fact of protecting freedom of religion, 
the constitution adopts an external perspective on religion (cf. for the parallel question for law 
Hart 1961). It inevitably treats religions as historically contingent social phenomena. For a true 
believer, this very thought is heretical. 
For the constitutional state, the threat is exacerbated by the fact that religious beliefs and com-
mands defy scientific proof (Leiter 2008:15 and 25). Therefore the state cannot assuage anxieties 
of religious addressees by showing that the legal expectation is not at variance with religious 
commands, or that the sacrifice is minor. 
Many religions are missionary. Believers have the duty, or they are at least encouraged and re-
warded, if they bring faith to those who have not had the privilege of awakening. Many religions 
are also not content with enunciating ethical precepts. They want to effectively ban unethical 
behaviour, in their members, but also in non-members. The unborn life shall be protected, the 
human genome shall not be manipulated, marriages shall not be dissolved. On all of these issues, 
in most modern democracies substantial fractions of the population think differently. If constitu-
tional protection gives religions room for thriving, this is likely to also heat religiously motivated 
conflict. The constitutional guarantee potentially makes it more difficult for government to hold 
society together. 
In one way or other, all religions are social. The individual believer's insight in and access to the 
supreme transcendental forces is facilitated, moderated or even mediated by more or less formal-
ised organisations. These organisations provide believers with the authoritative reading of holy 11 
 
texts, with rules and ceremonies for membership, with a religious community that generates or 
heightens their sense of identity, and with a host of more mundane services. From the perspec-
tive of state constitutions, the most important feature of religious organisation is governance. 
These organisations do not only give individual believers assistance. They aim at governing their 
lives. From the outside perspective of law, this is an exercise of power. Fundamental freedoms 
do not require that they be exercised in a power free vacuum. In this respect, the constitution 
even limits internal sovereignty. Yet the right to govern others is necessarily in conflict with the 
constitutionally protected freedom of addressees. The freedom of religious organisations to guide 
their members inevitably conflicts with the freedom of these same members to live the religious 
life they have been choosing themselves. It may also conflict with the desire of democratically 
elected government to govern these same lives. For both reasons, for a constitutional state grant-
ing autonomy is a greater risk than just granting individual freedom (more from Engel 2004). 
Finally, religious freedom is not only a precondition for a viable democracy (see again 
Böckenförde 1991:112). It at the same time is also a risk for democracy (Möllers 2009:84: “Ge-
fährdungen der demokratischen Gemeinschaftsbildung”). In their internal doctrines, religions 
need not be, and indeed often are not, individualistic. The supreme goal of religions is not the 
individual's autonomy but her fate in eternity, maybe also the victory of this religion over erro-
neous competitors. Religions may adhere to a concept of human dignity. But for them dignity is 
indirectly defined, by the individual's relationship with the transcendental, not directly by attain-
ing self-selected goals and aims. Religions may not value liberty at all. If they do, they do not 
define liberty the same way as democracies. For them, liberty is not deference to the individual's 
wishes whatever they happen to be. Rather they define liberty as liberating individuals from ob-
stacles that prevent them from recognising what truly matters for them (for a similar secular con-
cept see Habermas 1973).  
To the extent that religions are missionary, and that they care about state legislation being in line 
with religious ethics, granting freedom of religion creates a further problem for democratic gov-
ernance. Religion will be used as a conversation stopper (Rorty 1994). Religion instils “divisive-
ness” into politics (Breyer 2006:122, 124; Feldman 2006). Religious argument will be used to 
disempower the free marketplace of ideas. Much as those dominating a market of goods are 
tempted to turn regulation into a barrier to market entry (Holcombe and Holcombe 1986), reli-
gions are tempted to have the legislator help them combat their actual or potential competitors in 
the "free marketplace of religions" guaranteed by freedom of religion. 
IV.  Mitigating the Dilemma by Legal Pragmatism 
Seemingly, we have spotted a tragic dilemma. The power of the state to coerce saves religious 
freedom and the viability of democratic government. Yet at the same time freedom of religion is 
a threat for religions and the state. Seemingly we cannot make a definite recommendation. We 
must leave it to historical accident whether a constitution guarantees freedom of religion and, if 12 
 
so, how this freedom is interpreted. On grounds of principle, a narrow reading seems as justifia-
ble as a broad reading. 
Yet law is neither science nor philosophy. For good reason, the discipline is called jurisprudence. 
The adoption of a new rule, and a new interpretation of an existing one, are not predicated on 
deriving the rule from first principles, nor on grounding it in scientific evidence. For sure, the 
law should not be blind to science and philosophy. Over the last decades, the law as an academic 
discipline has become more and more scientific. Yet ultimately the law as a social technology is 
about dissolving conflict (more from Engel 2003a) and about governing peoples lives (more 
from Engel 2007a). The gold standard is neither consistency (more from Engel 2006b) nor objec-
tivity (cf. Daston 1999). Law is as good as its effects. The task of lawyers is not advancing 
knowledge, but making decisions. Ultimately, a decision is a good one because the professional 
legal decision maker is able and willing to take on responsibility for it (more from Engel 2009). 
In safeguarding religious freedom, the pragmatic nature of law is not only helpful. Given the 
otherwise tragic dilemma between necessity and threat, a pragmatic approach is the only feasible 
one. Pragmatism is of course never perfect (Barak-Erez 2009). Pragmatic solutions are “conven-
tions” (Sajó 2009:2411 f.), which gives them a dose of historical contingency, and traces of 
power play. Pragmatism risks to hiddenly privilege the religion of the majority (Sajó 2009:2417) 
and to perpetuate its historical dominance (cf. Ladeur and Augsberg 2007). Pragmatic interven-
tions are bound to be imperfect. They cannot dissolve the dilemma, but they may help mitigate 
its obnoxious effects. Pragmatism may take a long time to overcome religiously motivated re-
sistance. These days, the Bible is not proffered as a justification for slavery, although one may 
find passages in it that take slavery for granted (e.g. Exodus 21:2-6). But the Bible is used to jus-
tify the differential treatment of men and women (Solomon 2007). Pragmatic law does not stand 
outside the battles between competing religions, and between religion and the state. Pragmatic 
law is policy-making in the guise of legislation and adjudication.  
Yet pragmatic law is policy-making of a very special kind, and under very special conditions 
(more from Engel 2003b). The interpreter of the Constitution is not entitled to policy-making 
from scratch. While responsibility brings in a grain of subjectivism, the legal decision maker 
may not simply impose her individual will on the law's addressees. She is bound by the text of 
the Constitution and, much more importantly, by the judicial tradition of interpreting it. Any po-
litical argument must be couched in doctrinal terms. Legal power is not invested in individuals, 
but in complex institutional arrangements. The right of initiative is with the parties, not with 
those deciding. If the parties do not bring the right case, decision-makers must wait. Conversely, 
those directly interested in one solution, i.e. the parties, have no direct influence on the outcome. 
All they may do is exploit the opportunities of procedure, and make their case as compelling as 
they can. Usually, and in particular when it comes to constitutional scrutiny, legal decision-
makers are not individuals, but benches. They must give explicit reasons (more from Engel 
2007b), and they know that the reasons of today will be held against them tomorrow. If they 
change doctrine for one fundamental freedom, the change risks spreading over to other freedoms, 
where its effects might be less welcome. Even more fundamentally: judges know that the power 13 
 
of the judiciary will be curtailed if they more than very rarely fail to convince the population that 
their rulings are at least acceptable, if not desirable. 
Specifically, the pragmatic nature of law is able to address the three reasons why religious free-
dom is at the same time a necessity and a threat. Law is aware of the fact that all normative ar-
gument is fundamentally relative (more from Engel 2001). One can, for instance, not prove that 
the growth of the economy is more important than improving the dire fate of the needy. Nonethe-
less, constitutional law does not content itself with creating a procedure for policymakers to fight 
this out. For instance, the German Basic Law simultaneously guarantees freedom of commerce 
and property, and it obliges government to make sure that everybody has at least enough to lead 
a humane life. In principle, it is for the legislator to exactly draw the borderline. But the Consti-
tutional Court sees at it that the legislator does not overstep the constitutional limits. If necessary, 
as just a couple of months ago, the court even spells out that the law as it stands is no longer 
within these limits (BVerfG 9 Feb 2010, 1 BvL 1/09). 
The same techniques may be used to balance the freedom of one religion against the freedom of 
another, the freedom of religion against the freedom to choose not to be religious, the freedom of 
a believer against the autonomy of her religious organisation, and the freedom of religion against 
competing freedoms that are also constitutionally protected, or against objective goals that have 
constitutional status. Balancing is not calculable, but controlled. The conceptual steps are worked 
out in the principle of proportionality (Robbers 2005; Grimm 2009:2375). The way how they are 
used and filled is predetermined by the existing body of constitutional jurisprudence. 
The law is also prepared to alleviate the epistemic challenge. Courts may not refuse to decide 
cases. Yet in court, the scientific standards of evidence can hardly ever be met. The legal order 
has reacted by rules on the standard of proof and on the burden of proof. The standard depends 
on the relevance of the decision to be taken. But even the most stringent standard is content with 
silencing "reasonable doubt". And this high standard is not regarded as appropriate in all cases. 
Different legal orders have different techniques for alleviating the standard. American law may 
then be content with "preponderance of the evidence". Continental law would rather redistribute 
the burden of proof. It would for instance accept "prima facie" evidence, and leave it to the op-
ponent to cast doubt on its applicability in the case at hand. Of course, none of this makes it pos-
sible to prove the existence of God. Yet the legal order may accept a proxy. It may accept the 
consistency of theological doctrine, or a long-standing practice of a confession. 
Finally the law may also respond to the additional conflicts resulting from religions becoming 
missionary, or trying to influence general politics. Neither of this is prohibited. The former 
squarely comes under freedom of religion. The latter at least is protected by the general political 
freedoms. One may even discuss whether this too is an exercise of freedom of religion. Yet then 
religions try to impose their will on others who, themselves, are also protected by freedom of 
religion, including the freedom to decide against any religion at all. Therefore, constitutional 
freedom is pitted against constitutional freedom. If they try to introduce a religiously motivated 
argument into general politics, furthermore freedom of religion is pitted against the guarantees of 14 
 
democratic process. Using the principle of proportionality, the competing freedoms have to be 
balanced out. From the very fact that two constitutional protections are in conflict it follows that, 
in such cases, freedom of religion may be more intensely limited. 
Pragmatic law is sensitive to local conditions. If a conceptual divide does not affect the case at 
hand, pragmatic law sets it aside. It is content with "incompletely theorised agreement" (Sunstein 
1995). If a theoretical conflict is not practical in the concrete instance, pragmatic law grants more 
freedom to those present (Rosenfeld 2009:2343). As long as the demand for tolerance is margin-
al, as in the case of the Amish, pragmatic law is more open-minded than with respect to similar 
wishes from less contained religions (critical on this Sajó 2009:2422). If being strict on legal 
principles risks causing revolt, the judiciary may act more cautiously. It may start by establishing 
a principle, and granting exceptions for a while, announcing that it will become gradually strict-
er. If a community is already more advanced on the road towards tolerance, the judiciary may 
impose closer scrutiny on one and the same case here. Under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, this is brought about by the doctrine of “margin of appreciation” (Engel 1986; Mar-
tínez-Torrón 2005). 
Where the law cannot slight the conflict, it can try to transform it. The practically most important 
shift is from freedom to equality (Huster 2002; Grimm 2009). Instead of dissolving an intractable 
conflict between religions, religious and nonreligious people, or religion and the state, on 
grounds of first principles, the law approaches a solution from the premise that it may not dis-
criminate on transcendental grounds (see for the European Convention of Human Rights Tulkens 
2009:2582). One and the same action may not be treated differently only because in one case it is 
mandated or at least justified by religious doctrine (Eisgruber and Sager 2008). Translation re-
quirements may also be brought under this rubric. The neutrality of the law between religions 
does not require that the law bans any religiously motivated act and any religious speech from 
the public sphere. It suffices that the legal decision can be translated into a criterion that does not 
condition on religious doctrine, or on religiosity (Huster 2002; Sajó 2009:2401) (this is missing 
in Rosenfeld 2009).  
Finally, the law may offer religions a deal. If they are willing to organise themselves in a way 
that makes conflicts with other religions, with the nonreligious, or with the state less likely or 
more manageable, they are granted the privilege. To my reading, this is the essence of what in 
German law is often referred to as the choice between Staatskirchenrecht and Religionsrecht 
(Magen 2003; Classen 2006; Heinig and Walter 2007). Of course, giving churches the right to 
collect taxes through public administration, to send their teachers to public schools, to grant uni-
versity degrees, to be remunerated by government for running hospitals privileges them in com-
petition with other religions. Yet using the translation principle, this does not violate religious 
neutrality as long as the offer is good for any religion. It may be justified by the very reason why 
freedom of religion is a necessity. All these privileges not only help religions attracting believ-
ers. They also bring these religions into a permanent relationship with the state. Religions who 
accept these privileges have something to lose if they frustrate the legitimate expectations of the 
state. As part of the quid pro quo they have made themselves more "regulable" (the term has 15 
 
been coined by Lessig 1999) (for an application see Engel 2006a). Given religious conflicts are 
theoretically not tractable and have all too often proven atrocious for those suffering from them, 
I am convinced this technology for making these conflicts negotiable is justified. I think so, even 
if one acknowledges that the promise of these privileges puts religions under pressure to organise 
such that they become credible negotiation partners for the state. In Germany, this is currently an 
issue with Islam, since the Islamic religion is intrinsically less prepared to organisation than in 
particular the Catholic church. 
V. Conclusion 
Arbiters sometimes say with tongue in cheek: if both parties complain, the award can't be that 
bad. With my presentation of the issue I have certainly fulfilled the condition. I must have disap-
pointed believers, non-believers, religious organisations, government officials, and my legal col-
leagues. Believers will sure dislike the areligious perspective. Throughout this paper, I adopt an 
external perspective on religion. I see it as a social phenomenon. I insist that religions are histor-
ically contingent. I accept a religiously pluralistic society as a fact. I regard religion inasmuch as 
a threat as I regard it as a necessity for governing this world. I say that the signs of God's pres-
ence in this world, of which believers think dearly, do not count as proof. By contrast, non-
believers will dislike how much room I am willing to grant religion. I do not oblige government 
to combat what they see as superstition. I am not holding the absence of scientific evidence 
against religion. Through the many facets of pragmatism I effectively give government some 
room for supporting religiosity. I even allow for outright deals between the state and organised 
religions. Religious organisations will dislike that I allow for privilege only to the extent that it 
makes them vulnerable to regulatory intervention. They will also dislike that I am accepting their 
historically gained dominant positions in specific jurisdictions only to the extent that they can be 
translated into religion-neutral criteria, and that I insist on the constitutional right of competing 
religions to erode these dominant positions. Government officials will dislike that I am calling 
for tolerance even with religions that seem alien if not hostile to the culture on which this gov-
ernment's power is built. They may also find it restrictive that I limit the proper scope of gov-
ernment to the management of religious plurality. Finally my legal colleagues may dislike the 
external view on our discipline. I am not talking about the constitution because it is in force, but 
because it might be instrumental. It is key for my argument that legal doctrine is neither a mere 
exercise of logic, nor of tradition. For my solution to work the law in action must be only partly 
determined by the legislator. In my perspective, judges are not just legal professionals. They are 
policymakers, only of a different kind and under different constraints. Yet I deeply believe that 
partly disappointing all involved is the only possibility to overcome the otherwise tragic dilem-
ma. The constitutional protection of freedom of religion is indeed a precondition for religious 
freedom being a social fact. 16 
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